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Comment
A Reply to Professor Pothier's Review of Power Without Law: The
Supreme Court of Canada, the Marshall Decisions, and the Failure of
JudicialActivism

The Spring 2010 edition of the Dalhousie Law Journal contains an
article by Professor Dianne Pothier,' discussing my book, Power Without
Law: The Supreme Court of Canada, The Marshall Decisions and the
Failure of Judicial Activism. 2 In the review, Professor Pothier strongly
disagrees with the book's critique of the Supreme Court of Canada's
majority decision in R. v. Marshall.' In particular, she disagrees with the
argument that the alleged treaty right of aboriginals to hunt, fish, gather
and trade for necessaries, described in Justice Binnie's majority decision, is
constitutionally flawed. Professor Pothier also suggests that the argument
is the central thesis of the book. This is not so. The book enumerates
numerous factual and interpretative mistakes found in the decisions of
both the trial Court and the Supreme Court of Canada. All of them are
problematic. For example, the book describes findings of fact made by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the face of contrary evidence and the findings
of the trial judge. It also describes the inability of the Crown's expert to
discuss a document that the Supreme Court of Canada considered vital.
It comments on the fact that the argument adopted by the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada was first advanced in that Court, and was never
tested in the lower courts. The constitutional flaw in the majority analysis
of the treaty right is simply one among many other serious deficiencies in
the two judgments. But it is the one Professor Pothier chooses to dispute.
The first point made by Professor Pothier adds a gloss to the treaty
right in Marshall, and argues that the treaty right, so characterized, is
constitutionally sound. The treaty right described by Justice Binnie was a
"specially protected" "enforceable" "legal" right to hunt, fish, gather and

I. Dianne Pothier, "Book Review: Power Without Law: The Supreme Court of Canada, the
Marshall Decisions,and the FailureofJudicialActivism" (2010) 33 Dal LJ 189.
2.
Alex M Cameron, Power Without Law: The Supreme Court of Canada,The MarshallDecisions
and the FailureofJudicialActivism (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009).
3.
R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456. Several of Professor Pothier's disagreements are peripheral.
For example, Professor Pothier suggests that the rights in s 35(1) must be guaranteed, because s 35(4)
says the "rights referenced to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
But this simply means that males and females are equally guaranteed the rights that are "recognized
and affirmed" in subsection (1). The justaposition of the language of "guarantee" in s 35(4) confirms
that the language of "recognition and affirmation" in s 35(l) is not a guarantee.
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trade for necessaries. 4 The constitutional problem is that no such treaty
right was legal or enforceable in the absence of a law enacted by the House
of Assembly. We know that Governor Lawrence was well aware of his
constitutional limitations. He knew that the provision of the treaty limiting
trade to truckhouses required the House of Assembly to enact legislation;
he asked them to do that and they obliged, but that was the only legislation
he sought. Professor Pothier cites the Labour Conventions Case to the
effect that only the "obligations of a treaty which involve alteration of law"
require a statute.' It follows, she says, that since the treaty right to hunt;
fish,. gather and trade described by Justice Binnie was already the liberty
of anyone in the colony, including Natives, such a treaty right did not
require legislation. So, she argues, the book is in error and the treaty right
is constitutionally founded. To the extent that the treaty right was subject
to a limit of "necessaries," something she admits would have required
legislation, Professor Pothier proposes the following interpretation, "if
there were no expectations that the Mi'kmaq would in fact seek to gather
and trade beyond the level of necessaries any time soon, there would have
been no urgency in bringing forth any such implementing legislation." 6
Professor Pothier's approach is a mutation of the reasoning advanced
by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in dissent. McLachlin J. wrote that upon
signing the Treaties, native people merely "inherited" the general right of
all citizens to hunt, fish and trade.' Justice Binnie rejected the suggestion
that the native right was just a general liberty. He used his Barrington
Street8 example to state that the native right was a treaty right that "enjoyed
special treaty protection against interference with its exercise."9 Professor
Pothier argues, as noted, that because the native treaty right to hunt, fish
and trade was no different from the "domestic" liberty to hunt, fish and
trade, legislation to implement that treaty right was unnecessary. But a
native treaty beneficiary would have been unable to enforce the treaty right
to hunt, fish and trade. He could have enforced only the general liberty to
hunt, fish and trade. That is not the "special treaty protection" that Justice
Binnie contemplated. Professor Pothier seems to think otherwise. She
says "the treaty right Justice Binnie found was, prior to 1982, legal and
enforceable -so long as there was no inconsistent legislation." 0 In this,

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Supra'note 3 at paras 45 and 47.
Labour Conventions Case, [1937] AC 326 quoted in Pothier, supra note I at 193.
Supra note I at 193.
Marshall,supra note 3 at para 86.
Barrington Street, Halifax-'a common thoroughfare enjoyed by all," ibid at para 47.
Ibid.
Supra note I at 194.
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Professor Pothier is mistaken. This assertion, for which no authority is
cited, that the executive, by treaty, can affect domestic legal rights except
only if inconsistent legislation stands in the way, is entirely unfounded.
It is not law, and has never been, that treaties are enforceable domestic
law except in the presence of inconsistent legislation. As Professor Hogg
notes, "Canada's constitutional law, derived in this respect from the United
Kingdom, does not recognize a treaty as part of the internal (or "domestic")
law of Canada."" Treaty obligations are not law. Performance of treaty
obligations requires legislation unless the present law already reflects the
treaty obligations. But in either case, enforcement is the enforcement of
the law, not of the treaty. The fact is that the treaty right described by
Justice Binnie was not law and was not enforceable at any time prior to
1982. Had he recognized that, one might reasonably think he would have
recognized the implausibility of the treaty right he -propounded. After
all, his erroneous idea that the treaty right he envisaged was specially
protected, legal and enforceable was how he distanced himself from Justice
McLachlin's dissent. Justice Binnie ignored the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty.
Beyond this, the treaty right described by Professor Pothier in
advancing her argument is not true to the treaty right described by Justice
Binnie. Justice Binnie did not describe the treaty right as an unrestricted
right that might, in the future, be subject to some possible legislative limit
restricting it to "necessaries." He said it was "not a right to trade generally
for economic gain but rather a right to trade for necessaries,"l2 which
he went on to define as "food, clothing and housing, supplemented by
a few amenitites." 3 Inherent in the right he described was a limitation
on the right.14 Such a right had no parallel in domestic law and was
constitutionally null without legislation. Moreover, the Magna Carta,
which Professor Pothier acknowledges applied in Nova Scotia at the
relevant time, was a statute inconsistent with the treaty right described by
Justice Binnie. It precluded interference in the public right to fish. So the
treaty right construed by Justice Binnie which purported to limit that right
to fish was not simply unenforceable, it was unlawful.

11. Peter Hogg, Constitututional Law of Canada, 5th ed, loose-leaf (Thompson Carswell, 2007) vol
I at 11-5.
12. Marshall,supranote 3 at para 58.
13. Ibid at para 59.
14. Indeed the very II February 1760 document that Justice Binnie relied upon in divining the right
to hunt, fish, gather and trade for necessaries, contains the term "necessaries" (para 58), which led
Justice Binnie to describe the treaty right as a restricted right.
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In Pothier's description ofthe treaty right, part of the supposed right, the
right to hunt, fish and trade, did not require legislation because it reflected
domestic law. Except that the part of the treaty that would restrict the right
to trade to "necessaries" did require legislation to be enacted at some
future time. And another part of the treaty-the truckhouse bit-required
legislation which Governor Lawrence asked the House of Assembly to
enact and which they did enact. One can imagine Governor Lawrence
pacing in his office wondering how to explain this all to the Board of
Trade. Lawrence did not ask the House of Assembly for the legislation
proposed by Professor Pothier, restricting the treaty right to "necessaries,"
when he asked for the legislation restricting native trade to truckhouses.
That would suggest that the treaty right proposed by Professor Pothier is
as illusory as that propounded by Justice Binnie.
The second point advanced by Professor Pothier relates to Justice
Binnie's suggestion that in negotiations between natives and the British,
natives made "demands." It was those supposed demands which formed
the foundation upon which Justice Binnie built the controversial treaty
right to hunt, fish and gather for trade. Unfortunately Justice Binnie
ignored, among other evidence, the detailed minutes of the Governor's
Farm Ceremony, on 25 June 1761, where the Cape Breton Chief, "in the
name of all the rest" said, "our intentions were to yield ourselves up to
you without requiring terms on our part," "dispose of us as you please,"
"receive us into your arms; into them we cast ourselves." Native people
surrendered and there was no native demand upon which to build the
treaty right suggested by Justice Binnie. Professor Pothier cites another
book review by Professor Andrew Nurse as authority that such language
as that contained in the record of the 25 June 1761 Ceremony really was
not the language of surrender. Professor Nurse did not testify at the trial
in Marshall.But an expert historian called by Mr. Marshall did testify to
that effect. As the book explains," his evidence was rejected by the trial
judge.16 The book also mentions that the Crown's expert, whose evidence
was accepted by the trial judge but ignored by the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada, testified that the treaty terms were "dictated by the
British.""
Professor Pothier goes on to say that "to be genuine treaties of peace
and friendship, the Mi'kmaq must have gotten something positive out
15. Cameron, supra note 2 at 58-60.
16. R v Marshall,[1996] NSJ no 246 (PC) at para 127 where Embree PCJ states, "The interpretation
offered on behalf of the Defendant of the trade clause and the treaties, placed in the historical context
which is suggested as the appropriate one is not the one that I accept."
17. Cameron, supra note 2 at 99.
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of them."" They did. They got peace, friendship and truckhouses; not a
trifling result after a half century of conflict.
Professor Pothier's third point references the 30 November 1759
minutes of the Nova Scotia Executive Council, which Justice Binnie
ignored. This document is important because it shows that natives did
not demand truckhouses, as Justice Binnie suggested, but rather that the
truckhouses were proposed by the British to the Maliseet. Since the treaty
right crafted by Justice Binnie has as its foundation a supposed native
demand reflected by a supposed demand for truckhouses, the document
contradicts that right. The document says that Council proposed, "an
opportunity of extending their trade by the establishment of truckhouses
amongst them." Professor Pothier says that this "can be seen as confirming
Justice Binnie's interpretation of the treaty. Beyond the purely negative
covenant expressly included in the treaty, the British were supportive of
"extending" trade, i.e. a positive covenant."' 9
By negative covenant, Professor Pothier means the treaty clause
restricting native trade to truckhouses. By "positive covenant" Professor
Pothier means the treaty right to hunt, fish and gather for trade fashioned
by Justice Binnie. But that treaty right was founded upon a "demand" for
which there is no evidence, something Professor Pothier does not refute.
Moreover, it is true that the British were "supportive of "extending"
trade." But the document she quotes says only that the British proposed
"extending their Trade.. .by the establishment of Truckhouses." 20 It does
not go beyond that. And even Justice Binnie admitted that the establishment
of truckhouses alone did not support Mr. Marshall's argument.2 ' So there
was no evidence to support the "positive covenant" described by Justice
Binnie.
Finally, Professor Pothier takes exception to a very subsidiary point.
The point was that counsel in the subsequent native rights case of R.
v. Marshall22 would base argument strictly on law and evidence and
would not be dictated to. Professor Pothier says it is "absolutely wrong"
that "politicians.. .cannot dictate to prosecutors in Nova Scotia."23 She
points to s. 6(a) of the Public Prosecutions Act which authorizes the
Attorney General to issue written general instructions respecting classes

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Supra note I at 194.
Ibid at 195.
Ibid at 194.
Marshall,supra note 3 at paras 4, 7.
R v Marshall,[2005] 2 SCR 220.
Supra note 2 at 196.
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of prosecutions, to prosecutors.24 But Professor Pothier is too hasty. The
passage she criticizes is followed immediately by this: "Prosecutors
prosecute as they see fit, subject... to legal...constraints...but entirely
free of political influence." 25 Moreover, Professor Pothier's analysis is
itself wanting in suggesting that politicians dictate to prosecutors in this
Province. She fails to note s. 6(b) which authorizes the Attorney General
to make specific instructions respecting a specific prosecution; as a matter
of practice, that authority is almost never exercised. Moreover, it is only
the Attorney General that can issue instructions. The Attorney General's
constitutional role is unique and markedly different from that of any other
"run of the mill" politician: "It is a constitutional principle in this country
that the Attorney General must act independently of partisan concerns
when supervising prosecutorial decisions."26 So there is no particular error
in saying that politicians cannot dictate to prosecutors in this Province.
Only the Attorney General can do so, but only in a narrow non-partisan
context, and in specific cases it is something that is almost never done.
Professor Pothier goes on to criticize this author's supposed
inconsistency in applauding the independence of Nova Scotia prosecutors,
while extolling the intervention that forced New Brunswick to withdraw
a proposed concession in R. v. Marshall.27 There is no inconsistency.
Prosecutor's decisions should be insulated, but those that are not
reasonably founded in evidence and law are properly reversed, whatever
the applicable regime.

Alex M. Cameron

24. Public ProsecutionsAct, SNS 1990, c 21.
25. Supra note 2 at 197 [emphasis added].
26. Krieger v Law Society ofA Iberia, [2002] 3 SCR 372 at para 30.
27. Supra note 22.

